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CHAPTF:R I 
INTROilJCTION 
Until recently, the general public, educato!'s1 and the legal pro.fession 
have had little concern about student personal appearance rights in the 
public educational system. F\lrthermore, the whirlwind of controversy that 
existed over these rights, at tirst glance, appeared trivial. However, the 
legal and personal issues involved are serious. 
The student wants the beneti t of a public education without sacrificing 
any of his legal or personal rights. But the availability or public education 
is of neoessi ty orten BUbject to compliance with school regulations goveming 
student appearance and conduct. The school 'a rules and regulations are to 
establish efficient, effective, and orderly public schools so that the 
process of education my successfUl.ly continue. This results in a con-
frontation between the right or the public school to establish student 
appearance regulations and the legal and personal rights of the student. 
The courts are petitioned "to review the legality of such regulations 
and may order reinstatement or enrollment when the exclusion is made pursuant 
to regulations that are unreasonable, arbitrary, or discriminatory, or when 
1 
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the exclusion inf'ringes upon some constitutional right.• As a result, both 
federal and state cou:rts have been criticized by educators, students, the 
general public, and the legal profession. 
Ira Jlarienhoft, a New York educator er! ticized court decisions by 
'tll"itings 
••• the courts will succeed eventually in immobilizing the school's 
ability to control conduct, prescribe standards and set educational goal.a 
• • • they have obstructed the disciplinary function of the school regard-
ing the removal of troublesome students who make it impossible for other 
students to leam •••• They have dEnied the right ••• to prescribe 
standards or suitable dress. The courts have prevented the training 
or the young in the awareness of reaponsibili ties that are oonnensurate 
with rights and privileges •••• The rights of those disturbed are as 
nothing compared to the •right of this child to an education." Just 
'why the courts have been more solicitous in this matter than in the 
rights of those others to their education is a question not answered. 
Indeed,· that question is not even raised. Counsel for the students 
must be present, and no mention is made of counsel for the multitudes 
that wish to learn but cannot because the courts have ordered the 
miscreant to remain. 
Do the courts really care ••• ? 'Where does the responsibility 
of the school as the protector of the socia.l values end? What happens 
when the students understand that· no decision of the school is .final, 
that the teachere have no means to enforce standards o~ honesty, 
probity, and integrity that ma.7 not be assaulted in the ·courts and 
there find a sympathetic judgement?. • • The courts intrude with 
alacrity into areas of which they are ignorant, with rulings that 
herald the end ot restraint and responsibility by the school in 
deference to the presumed rights of students who will listen to no 
regulations because the courts havf become boards of education as the 
latter have become debating clubs. 
1John E. Bugg, "Constitutional Law-Public School Authorities Regulating 
the Style of a Student .. 's Hair," North Carolina Law Review, 47 (December, 
1968), 1n. 
2rra Marienhoff, "The Courts and the Schools: a Dissent," Social 
Fducation, XII (December, 1967), PP• n9-720. 
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Although this point of view is not held by the majority of educators, a 
vocal minor! ty has made known its position. 
Various positions are held by the students. Some students appear to 
agree with the position stated by the American Civil Liberties Union. It 
states that "While admitting that an individual's opinion is ueually expressed 
through the written or spoken word, ••• •personal taste in dress and groom-
3 
:1ng is another technique in self expression. '" These students and the 
American Civil Liberties Union contend that education should not be granted 
on the basis of personal appearance. In general, these students believe 
that •as long as a student •s appearance does not in fa.ct disrupt the educa-
tional process, or constitute a threat to safety, it should not be of any 
concern to the school."h Other students believe that school rules should 
be followed until they may be changed by students and administrators. And 
still a third group believes authority should be unquestioned. Similar 
views are held by the general public. 
The legal profession's position is delineated by Mr. Ga?Tison when he 
wrote a 
As a general rule decisions of school boards affecting the 
good order &."'ld discipline of the school are .fi.~ when they re-
late to the right of pupils to enjoy school privileges. Courts 
3"Civil Liberties,"American Civil Liberties Union, (January, 1966)1 
P• .3. 
livarvin R. Pl.asco, "School Student Dress and Appearance Regulations,• 
Cleveland-Marshall Law Review, 18 (January., 1969)1 149. 
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are not concerned with errors of judgement, but the reasonable-
ness of regulations is a question of law tor the courts despite 
the presumption that such regulations are a reasonable exerciae 
of discretion. Whether a l'lll.e is reasonable is aubjeot to in-
quiry by the courts, and they may compel, by mandamls, the S 
directors of a school to admit a pupil unlawful.lT excluded. 
·which position represents a true picture of the law'l It ia the purpose 
of this thesis to trace the developamt of court deciaiona in the tm.ited 
states which have in.f'luenced and determined students• personal appearance 
rights in public high schools between 1900 and 1968. The cases will be 
presented and interpreted so that the reader can understand how the courts 
have reached these decisions and then decide which position is the JOOat 
representative of the law. 
Certain limitations were made in researching this thesis. One was to 
limit research to student appearance casee at the secondary public school 
level. A second was to limit prilllBrT resource research to official and 
unotf"icial state supreme oourt and federal court reporters because the 
lower state courts do not require court transcripts for eaoh case and be-
cause there is no categorization of lower state court decisions. A third 
limitation was that although the writer is not a legal expert, she baa 
presented the law with aome interpretation for the reader. The reader 
should be cautioned that only legal background and :tnterpret&'!::4_on which is 
necessary to understand the courta' decisions is provided. 
Sserge H. Oe.rrison, "Rill.ea and Regulations-Reasonableness and Validity1 " 
North Dakota Law Revift', 37 (January, 1961)1 122. 
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In order to present an accurate study of the development of court 
decisions the thesis is divided into five separate and distinct chapters. 
Chapter one evaluates the need, purpose, and format of' the thesis. Chapter 
two examines the adJD:lnistrative agency, state court procedure, and early 
state court decisions. Chapter three is similar to chapter two; however, 
it concerns itself with later state court decisions. Chapter four sorutia-
izea the federal district courts' and the United States supreme Court's 
procedure and decisions. In chapter .:rive, the administrative agency 1a 
sumnarized, a synopsis of the state court, federal district court, and 
United States Supreme Court•a procedure is presented, conclusions as to 
court decisions are deduced, and recommendations for .further research are 
ma.de. It should also be noted that each chapter has an introduction, body 
of information, 8UDll'Dllr:y1 and conclusions. 
In addition, the footnotes for all the legal references are cited 
according to legal form and the footnotes for all non-legal re.f erences are 
cited according to standard thesis form. This is done for the reader• s 
convenience so that the reader may Without dif.:riculty refer to the sources 
he may wish to examine. 
In summary, there is recent concern over the confrontation between the 
right of the public school to establish student appearance regulations so 
that the educative process may continue and the legal and personal rights of 
the student. The courts are petitioned to settle the legality or such 
disputes. .And they, in tum, are criticized by educators, students, the 
general public, and the legal profession. Divergent views are held in each 
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group, but enough questions are asked by all the groups to establish the 
need for the research study presented. The purpose of this thesis is to 
answer these questions by tracing the development or court decisions in 
the United States which have influenced and determined students' personal 
appearance rights in public high schools between 1900 and 1968. 
CHAPTER II 
PRF,-DRPRESSION STUDENT DRESS RIGHTS AT THF. STATE COURT LEVEL 
Before beginning a chronological stuey of student appearance cases at 
the state level, it is necessaey to ascertain the purpose of an administra-
tive agency, to determine the school board's role as an administrative 
agency, and to understand the relationship bet'Ween the school board and the 
state courts. 
An administrative agency is created by the legislature and its authority' 
is restricted to the power it is delegated by the legislature. Since the 
legislature may not delegate more power than it has, the administrative 
agency's authority is f'llrther restricted b,y the federal and state constitu-
tions. 
The agency's .functions have been compared and contrasted with the 
legislative, executive, and judicial functions of the government. The 
legislative function establishes a future course of conduct tor a group of 
people by ma.king rules. The executive .function enforces these rules. 
'While the judicial function of the agency adjudicates or determines the 
present rights and duties based on a past incident, many times these .functions 
overlap and merge. 
In general, the government and the people have recognized administrative 
7 
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agencies as an essential part of our governmental structure. Attormt7 Gen-
eral iilrst in l9S5' said, •ThaJ' were created as a neceua17 -8D8 tor pro-
tecting public intereeta 1'hich could not be nitabq protected. b,r the ooarta 
or other means •••• .Administrative agencies mat be enabled and pend.tted 
to 1\lnction ef.f.lcientq and eftectiveq it the public interest wtd.cth 18 
their J>rial'7 concern, 18 to be preaervect.•6 
The administrative ageney1 1n thia inatance the aohool board, prorldea 
a specialised and orderq proceu to Mf'ill the needs ot a pa.rticular aee-
ment of 1ociet7. A great number of people are not autticientq attectecl 
b,r 80llle action to assert their interests in a judicial proceeding whioh 
any consider aa awkard, al.ow, and expaud.ve. The administrative agenq 
offers theae people convenient, specialised., and apeedT decisions. 
In D.l.inois, as in moat atatea, the legislature delegates power to the 
school board by 8&J'ing that the aohool board ahall have the PQRl" • t o 
adopt and enforce all neceU&l"T rulea for the aanagement and goyermnent ot 
the public school.a of their diatriot.•7 The statute gives the aobool board 
the power to achieve the baaio objectiTe of edllcation. The school suld be 
in a chaotic state uneu1table tor teaching and leaming without rules ade 
6Jamea lilrst, The Growth or •ncan Law (st. Paul, 19SO) at la23. 
7111. Rev. stat. (1967) ch. 122, I l<>-20.s. 
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and en.forced b.r the school board or its representatives. However, the 
8 tatute is not to be interpreted as giTing dictatorial powers to the school 
board. The school board nm.st follow an orderly procedure while making, 
enforcing, or adjudicating. otherwise, there w01ld be a violation ot the 
individual's rights to due process of law as guaranteed by the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the lhl.ted States Constitution. 
If' the individual believes he is adversely' affected or aggrieved 
because of an agency action, he has recourse to judicial review by a cOlll't. 
Oeneral.J:,-1 the court 'Will review the agency action to determine if an in-
dividual's rights have been Violated only arter all administrative avenues 
are exhausted. In moat cases, the court cannot determine if the individual 
was aggrined by the adad.niatrative ageney until the administrative r~ee 
are extauated. 
Once the court does decide to review the action, it •7 review all ti. 
administrative functions. To enmi.ne the rule, the court generall.y applies 
a three part validity' teat which states "a legielative rule is valid •• • it 
it is (a) w.1.th1.n the granted power, (b) issued pursuant to proper procedure~ 
8 
and (c) reasonable." If' the rule cloea not violate the three part validity 
teat, it ie ae binding on the court as a etatute. Ir there ia a Violaticm 
8xenneth o. Davia, Adminiatrattve Law Text (1~9) hereinafter cited aa 
Davia 1 at 87. 
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of this test, the school board's decision cannot stand. 
The areas of enforcement and adjudication are difficult to distinguish. 
Fnforcement may be the result of adjudication, or it may occur as a separate, 
independent function,. or it may be a separate, independent function which 
is later ratified by the board in its adjudicating capacity. The court uses 
the substantial-evidence rule to review the board •a action 1n the areas of 
enforcement and adjudication. This rule llmi ts its elf to the reasonableness 
test in revienng findings of .tact while deciding questions of law. Ques-
tions of law include constitutional law, statutory law, common law, admin-
istrative jurisdiction, .fair administrative procedure, arbitrary or 
capricious action, and abuse of discretion. 
If the statute does not prescribe the methods by which and the circum-
stances in 1¥hich administrative action is to be reviewed by the court, the 
individual my resort to extraordinary remedies. The purpose of these 
remedies is to enforce a right or to prevent the violation of an individual's 
rights. These remedies include write of mandams, prohibition, quo warranto, 
certriorari, habeas corpus, and many others. Sometimes the individual may 
also seek injunctive relief in the court of equity. It is up to the individ• 
ual to seek the proper avenue to have his case reviewed by the court. His 
case will not be reviewed unless he chooses the proper remedy. However, if 
the statute has indicated other methods and circumstances for administrative 
action to be reviewed, the court is unlikely to permi. t these remedies to be 
used. 
11 
P!nally, it must be kept in mind that the court is not to assume the 
power delegated to the school board and overtum decisions which are with:ln 
the discretion of the board. The court ia only to review deciQions to 
prevent an abllee of power. 
The first recorded case regarding student appearance 1"8gulations was 
llcCaskill v. Bowar.9 lfr. McCaskill sought to restrain the superintendent 
and public school trustees from refusing admission to his two sons because 
they had :failed to comply with a regulation which stated". • • each male 
pupil over four feet and six inches in height and between certain named 
10 
ages is required to wear a uniform which costs the sum of $13 •••• r. 
He alleged that the regulation was unconst:ttutional. 
Relief was denied by the Georgia court because Mr. McCasld.ll bad not 
chosen the proper procedure to :f'ollow. He should have alleged that the 
ru.le was enforced and then sought a lfrit of mandanus to compel the school 
officials to admit his children. 
In Carr v. Inhabitants of the Town of Dighton, the Carr children were 
expelled from school because they were lia....ridden, ~t they were to be 
11 
readmitted once the situation ws corrected. The jury was to decide if 
9126 Ga. 3411 54 S. E. 942 (1906). 
lOid. at 943. 
-
11 299 Mass. 3041 ll8 N. E. 52$ (1918). 
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the school committee acted in good .faith. The juey was not asked to deter-
111.ne if the school board's regulation •s reasonable, hit on.17 if their 
regulation was enforced with dne regard to the rights of the Carr tamil.Y'• 
There were five points for the jury to consider. The7 werel (1) Mr. 
Carr said the school committee did not give him the opportuni t,. to be heard, 
(2) later one member of the school board stated there was a misunderstanding 
in not giving Mr. CalT a hearingt (3) only" three of the five children ware 
e:xairdned far lice before sending all five children home from ach>ol, (b) 
there was teatimon.7 that the children ware free of bead lice, and (5) lfr. 
Garr referred to the revenge.fulness of the teachers. The jur;r decided tor 
Mr. Carr. 
The legal encyclopedia, 09!"R}!S Juris Seoundum., atateai 
The decision of such board, if exercised in good faith, on natters 
affecting the good order and discipline of the school is final as 
far aa it relates to the rights of pupile to enj07 school priv-
ileges, and the courts w.Ul not interfere with the exercise of such 
authority unless it has been illegally" or unreasonably" exercisedJ 
but the courts will interfere to prevent tie enforcement of a rule 
which deprives the pupil of rights. • • • 
The school committee was not acting in good f'aith since it did not follow the 
proper procedure which would give Mr. Carr the opportunity to present his 
aide of the issue. If it ware evident that the school comnittee had follond 
the proper procedure of granting Mr. C&?T a hearing and safeguarding his 
legal rights, this case would not have been left to the jury to determine the 
.facts. Ho tactual issues of whether the school com:lttee •s acting 1n good 
tai th 110ulcl have occurred. 
1279 c. J. s. Schools and School District.a 8494 (1952). 
In Valentine v. Independent School District, the school board was 
13 
accused of being unreasonable and arbitrary in the making of a regulation. 
After Miss Valentine successfully completed four years of high school, she 
was ready to graduate. Her cl.ass was told by the school board and superin-
tendent that they were to wear caps and gowns .tor the graduating CereD10n1"• 
Miss Valentine rented her cap and gown and bad them fumigated. She waa 
told by the health peywician that they still might be contagious. In 
addition, they' also bad an extr~ offensive smell which sickened I.ti.as 
Valentine and her classmates. Qoi graduation night, all but three members 
of the class refused to wear the caps and gowns. OnJ.7 these three members 
received their diplomas. 
In order to enter collage Miss Valentine needed her high aohool record 
and her diploma. The superintendent refused to relinquish them because he 
claimed that the7 were his private property. Miss Valentine took her plea 
to a trial court asking for a writ of mandanns to have the records and 
diploma delivered to her. The trial court decided against her. 
She then went to the higher court on appeal. The court granted her 
the writ stating •. • • we are of opinion that the order of the board was 
unreasonable and arbitrary• and therefore such a rule as the bo#J ... 1 had not 
a right to make, and that the board exceeded 1te powera.•14 
13187 la. 5551 17h N. w. 334 (19l9)J 191 la. llOO, 183 N. W. 434 (1921). 
14Id. at 339. 
-
Two years later the Independent School District was still fighting the 
writ of mandamus given to Miss Valentine. The Iowa Supreme Court confirmed 
this decree. The court then 119nt on to says 
The wearing of a cap and gown on commencement night has no rela-
tion to educational values, the discipline of the school, schol-
astic grades, or intellectual advancement. Such a rule may be 
justified in some instances from the viewpoint of economy 1 but 
f'rom a legal viewpoint the board might as well attempt to direct 
the wearing of overalls by the boys and calico dresses by the 
girls. The enforcement of such a rule is purely arbitrary and 
especially so when the o.f'f ending pupil has been passed for grad-
uati on af"ter the performance on her part of all prescribed edu-
cational requiremaits. We are not questioning the propriety of 
wearing capa and gowne. It is a custom we approve. The board 
may deny the right of a graduate to participate in the~public 
ceremony of graduation unless a cap and gown is worn.15 
The court did not :recognise a relationship between oaps and gowns for 
graduation and educational values. As a result, the superintendent and 
school board 1'9re forced to release Miss Valentine's records and diploma. 
But the court did recognise the board's right to elCClude graduates from 
participating in the ceremony if they did not comply with their rnle. 
Another case in which the reasonableness ot a regulation •a the 
issue was Jones v. naz.16 The board of trustees of a public agricultural 
high school in Mississippi bad passed two regulations that Jlr. Jones 
sought injunctive relief to perpetually enjoin the enforce.nt or and to 
have these two regulations null and void. The first regulation •s that 
l5Id. at 436, 437. 
-
l.6i21 Miss. 1361 89 So. 906 (1921)1 18 A. L. R. 61.6 (1922). 
15 
the students were required to wear khaki uniforms and that the students 
were to own no more nor less of these uniforms than specified. The second 
regulation Mr. Jones objected to was that all students were to wear at all 
times (including weekends) the prescribed khaki uniforms when visiting 
public places within five miles or the school. 
The lower court found that the orders of the board of tl'llstAies were 
not so unreasonable since the testimony indicated that the uni.forms aided 
in school discipline. !kt.t the court added" ••• if it is the purpose to 
invade the home and undertake to say what the children should 'W98.r at home, 
that 110uld be unreasonable. n17 
The Mi.seissippi Supreme Court upheld the lower court's decree. The 
higher court reasoned since this "Ml8 an agricultural school With a do~ 
tor;r, the school was acting in loco parentis. This meant the school bad 
the authority to control the pupil when he was in school. Po;.,;;:-c:ling students 
were to follow the rules at all times since the school was acting in place 
of their parents. Day students were to .follow the l'llles and regulations 
on the way to school, 1n school, and on the •7 home. Once home, the 
parents reswned their role and the student becam a child under the direc-
tion of his parents. Jones v. Paz was interesting because it clearly' de-
fined the school's role as in loco parentis and the parent's role as natural 
18 parents. 
17M· at 906. 
18,!g. 
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At times the reviewing courts differ as to determining why the actions 
of a school should be upheld. The case of Pugalez v. Sellmeyer is an 
example of suoh a disagreement.19 Miss Pugsley,, an eighteen year old 
woman,, refused to submit or obey the rule that stated, "The wearing of 
transparent hosiery,, low-necked dresses,, or any style of clothing tending 
toward immodesty in dress,, or the use of face paint or cosmetics, is 
prohibited."20 
Miss Pugsley was told to wash the talcum powder off her face and not 
to return to school with 1 t on. She returned, offered herself as a student, 
but was denied admission because she infringed the rule by continuing to 
use talcum powder on her face. She then re:f\lsed to obey the rule and •s 
denied admission. 
Miss Pugsley went to court to petition for a w.rit of mandams to 
conpel the defendants to reinstate her as a pupil in the public school. 
Before the court l'IOuld decide if there were an issue, both the school 
board and Vise Pugsley wmld have to follow the proper procedure. Since 
Miss Pugsley did not follow the proper procedure by first app:cying for 
relief' to the school directors,, the court did not have an administrative 
action to review. The lower court denied her relief. 
19158 Ark. 247,, 2$0 s. YT. 5381 30 A. L. R. 1212 (1923). 
20Id. at 1213. 
-
17 
She then took her case to the Arkansas Supreme Court. It denied the 
appeal and upheld the lower eourt•s decision even though the Supreme Court 
said the wrong reason was given. The higher court held the rule -was not 
void and relief should have been denied on that ground. 
The following section very concisely stated the sentiment of the 
Arkansas Supreme Courts 
Courts have other and more important .functions to perform than that 
of hearing the complaints of disaffected pupils of the public schools 
against rules and regulations promu1gated by the school boards for 
the government o:f' the schools. The courts have this right of review, 
for the reasonableness of such rule is a judicial question, and the 
courts will not ref\lse to perform their .functions in determining the 
reasonableness of such rules, when the question is presented. But, 
in doing so, it will be kept in mind that the directors are elected 
by the patrons of the schools over which they preside, and the elec-
tion occurs annually. These directors are in close and intimate 
touch with the affairs of their respective districts, and know the 
conditions with which they have to dea.l.. It will be remembered also 
that respect for constituted authority and obedience thereto are an 
essential lesson to qualify one for the duties of citizenship, and 
that the schoolroom is an appropriate place to teach that lessonJ 
so that the oourts hesitate to substitute their 'Will and judgment 
for that of the school board.81 which are delegated by law as the 
agencies to prescribe rules for the government of the pu~ic schools 
of the state, which are supported at the public expense. 
!be majority of the Arkansas Supreme Court believed that the school 
board as an administrative agency 11&.s to •ke rules, enforce these rnles, 
and adjudicate if necessa?"71 since it •s more .familiar with these areas as 
far as education was concerned. '1'he court also thought that rules taught 
21~. at 1215. 
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respect for authority which was an important lesson for citizenship that 
the school was to teach. And finally the court indicated that if the 
public was not satisfied with the school board and its rules, it could 
elect new members at the next annual election. This sentiment appeared 
to be the attitude of most state court in pre-depression days. 
However, Pu.gslez v. Sel.lmeyer was the first case in which there was 
a dissenting opinion. 22 JUstice Hart was the first justice to publlcal.q 
question the reasonableness and discretion of a school rule as tar as 
student dress was concerned. He said, 
••• I think that a rule forbidding a girl pupil of her age from 
putting talcum powder on her face is so tar unreasonable and be-
yond the exercise of discretion that the court should. say that 
the board of directors acted without authority in making and en-
forcing it. "11.aeless lawa diminish the authority of necessary 
ones." The tone of tbe majority opinion exemplifies the wisdom 
of thie old proverb.23 
In People ex re1• Lamme I• BugkJ.and. Mr. Lamme 1s daughter •• expelled 
from school because she refused to comply' 'With a rule ma.de by the school 
committee which prescribed uniforms to be worn by the girls. 24 Mr. Lamme 
petitioned in his daughter's behalf for a writ of mandams to compel her 
reinstatement in the high school. Both the lower and higher courts denied 
22158 Ark, 247, 250 S. vr. 5381 30 A. L. R. 1212 (192.3). 
23rd. at 1216. 
-
24a4 Colo. 2401 269 P. 15 (1928). 
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Mr. Lamme's daughter relief. Neither Colorado court commented on the school 
board's rules and regulations. Instead, the court commented that Mr. Lanna 
had not followed the proper procedure. He should have exhausted all admin-
istrative avenues, in this case the county superintendent. An expert in 
the field of administrative law, Mr. Kenneth Davis, very nicely summarizes 
the courts• basis for their reasoning by' saying, "• •• every court requires 
exhaustion when the question presented is one 'Iii.thin the ageney•a special-
ization and when the administrative remedy' is u likely as the judicial 
remedy to provide the wanted reliet.•25 Since the superintendent and the 
school board were a specialized administrative agency, all avenues of 
relief had to be attempted before the court would review the administrative 
action. 
It should be noted that again aa in fugae1y v. Sellmezer, there •s 
a dissenting opinion. 26 One justice of the Colorado Supreme Court felt that 
the question should have been heard by' the court. Although it is not clearJ.7 
stated in the record that the justice -.s in agreement nth Mr. Lanna and 
his daughter, overtones suggested that the justice might have been sympa-
thetic to them. 
In sumary, the school board is recognized as a specialized adminis-
25Davis at 356. 
26158 Ark. 2471 250 S. w. 5381 30 A. L. R. 1212 (1923). 
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trative agency capable of rule making, enforcement, and adjudication within 
the authority granted by the legislature and further limited by the federal 
and state constitutions. Its purpose is to manage the schools so that the 
process of education may successfully continue. 
If the individual believes that the administrative action has violated 
his rights 1 he bas recourse to judicial review by a court. The court will 
normally review administrative agenoy action only when the proper legal 
procedure is followed. But the court is not limited to reviewing one 
function of the administrative agency. To review rule making, the court 
uses the three part validity test. To review the areas of enforcement 
and adjudication, the court uses the substantial-evidence rule. However, 
the purpose of the court is not to usurp the author:i.ty granted to the 
school board, but to be certain there is no abuse of power by the school 
board and its representatives. 
All litigation concerning student dress and appearance has occurred 
in the t119lltieth century. There were three pre-depression instances of 
parents wishing to enjoin school boards from making and enforcing rules 
which prescribed uniforms. In 1906, in the case of McCaskill v. Bower, 
the Georgia Supreme Court eliminated the case .from review because M:r. 
Mccaskill failed to select the proper remedy and did not allege that the 
rule bad been enforced.27 Fifteen years later in the case of Jones v. Day, 
27126 Ga. 3Ll, Sh s. E. 942 (1906). 
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28 the proper procedure was used. The Mississippi court upheld a rule re-
quiring uniforms as valid and reasonable because the school indicated it 
assisted in maintaining discipline. Seven years later in People ex rel. 
Lamme v. Bucklan<\, the court did not comment on the uniform requirement 
regulation because the plaintiff had not exhausted all administrative 
avenues.29 
In the case of Carr v. Inhabitants of the Town of Dighton, the rights 
of the Carr family were violated.30 A rule prohibiting lice-ridden children 
from attending school was reasonable, but the court overturned the board's 
action. The school board did not follow the proper procedure of granting a 
hearing and discriminated against the Carr tamily. 
In Valentine v. IndeP!11dent School District_, the Court reserved the 
right to see if a rule was related to educational objectives.31 It declared 
a rule unreasonable which provided for withholding the high school records 
and diploma of a student for refusing to wear a cap and gOltl'l during the 
graduation ceremny. But the court did recognize the board's right to 
require students to 119B.r caps and gowns if they were to participate in 
the graduation ceremony. 
28i27 Miss. 1361 89 So. 906 (1921)1 18 A. L. R. 6ltS (1922). 
2984 Colo. 240, 269 P. lS (1928). 
30299 Mass. 3041 118 N. E. 525 (1918). 
3l187 la. 5551 174 N. W. 334 (l919)J 191 la. 11001 183 N. W. 434 (1921). 
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The court in Pugsley v. Sel,lmeyer suheld a dress rule made by the 
school board.32 The court did not look to the educational objectives ot 
the rule and it assumed the rule to be valid until proven invalid. The 
court also indicated the school board was better suited than the court 
to decide if the rule was neoessar;r. Only Justice Harlan questioned the 
rule's reasonableness, but he did not explain his legal basis .for this con-
clusion. 
An explanation for the limited number of student dress litigation might 
be traced back to Pritt v. Snodqys.33 This case -was cited in most student 
dress cases. Mr. Pritt questioned the right of the school board to regulate 
social activities outside of school. The Missouri court confirmed the board's 
right to regulate. The concurring opinion stated the court's position. It 
sa.id.1 "'When the school room is entered by the pupil, the authority of the 
parent ceases, and that of the teacher beginsJ when sent to his home, the 
authority of the teachers ends, and that of the parent is resumed. For his 
conduct when at school, he my be punished or eTen expelled, under the proper 
oircumatancesJ for his conduct when at home, he is subject to domestic con-
troi. n.34 Another reason for limited litigation might be that the public 
32158 Ark. 2471 250 S. w. 5381 30 A. L. R. 1212 (1923). 
3366 Mo. 286, 27 Am. R. 343 (1877). 
34rd1 at 298. 
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agreed with the rules and regulations made by the school board. Perhaps, 
the administrative agency because of its power to make rules, enforce, and 
adjudicate, settled many disputes. Or an alternative ml.ght be that it was 
easier to comply with the rule or regulation than to litigate. 
The following conclusions may be reached after an~ing the oases in 
this chapter: (1) the school board's right to make rules that regulate 
studE11t dress and appearance was established, (2) the courts preferred to 
let the school board settle disputes, (.3) both the school board and the 
individual were to follow the proper procedure, (4) the three part validity 
test •s applied by the court to determine the legality of the school rule, 
(5) the court, in Jcnea v. Day and in Pue;slez v. Sellmezer, accepted the 
school board's rule as reasonable without questioning the purpose or objec-
tive& of the rule, (6) the minority opinion in Pugsl& v. Sellmeyer accused 
the school board's rule of being unreasonable, bu.t gave no criteria tor 
this conclusion, and (7) the court in Valentine v. Ind!P!!!dEllt School District 
questioned the board's educational objectives before determining if' the 
rules were reasonable • .35 
3S 127 Miss. 1.36, 89 So. 906 (1921) J 158 Ark. 247 1 250 s. W. 5381 30 
A. L. R. 1212 (1923)J .!!!•J 187 la. 555, 174 N. w. 3.34 (1919)J 191 la. noo, 
18.3 N. w. 434 (1921). 
CHAPTER III 
POST-DF.PRFSSION STUD'F:NT DRFSS RIGHTS AT THE STATR COORT LEVEL 
The administrative agency's purpose and ill.notions in post-depression 
cases is the same as its pre-depression role. The administrative agency 
has been recognized by the government and the people as a necessary part 
in our governmental structure. Its purpose is to fulfill the needs ot 
the people in a specialized capacity. It offers convenience, special-
ization, and speediness in reaching a decision. In a society as large 
as this one, this is an indispensable service. 
The administrative agency, in this instance, the school board, derives 
its authority from the legislature. The legislature may limit the adminis-
trative agency as it sees necessary and further restrictions are made by 
the federal and state constitutions. Generally, the school board may make 
rules, enforce, or adjudicate to secure the best possible educational 
results as long as the individual's rights are not violated and the proper 
procedure is followed. 
If an individual feels he has been aggrieved by the administrative 
agency action, he may seek redress. Administrative remedies are available 
and usually should .f'lrst be exhausted be.fore petitioning the court to review 
the administrative agency's actions. 
24 
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The court may review all or part of the administrative ageney•e functions 
if it .find.a it necessary: 
••• to prevent the enforcement of a rule which deprives a pupil 
of rights to which the law entities him or which tends to alienate 
the pupil .from proper parental authority, or which manifestly 
reaches beyond its sphere or action, and relates to subjects in no 
way connected with the management or successful operation of the 
school, ar which is plainl.T calculated to subvert or l"l~rd the 
leading object of the school legislation of the state.J 
Generally, the court applies the three part validity test to examine the 
administrative agency rule. This three part test states "• •• a legisla-
tive rules is valid ••• if it is (a) within the granted power, (b) issued 
pursuant to proper procedure, and (c) reasonable."37 In the areas of the 
board's enforcement and adjudication of school rules, the court uses the 
substantial-evidence rule. This rule limits itself to the reasonableness 
test in reviewing tacts while deciding questions of law. 
In some states, the methods by which and the circumstances in 1'hich 
administrative action is to be reviewed by the court is not specified. 
In these instances, the individual may use extraardinar,y remedies or in-
junctive relief in a court of equity to enforce a right ar to prevent the 
violation of his rights. It is important to remember that the individual 
3679 c. J. s. Schools and School Districts 1494 (19S2). 
37navis at 87. 
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has the responsibility for selecting the proper remedy. If the statute 
establishing the administrative agency indicates methods and circumstances 
for administrative action to be reviewed, the court probably will not 
permit other remedies to be used. 
Lastly, it mst be remembered that the court is only to review decisions 
to prevent an abuse of power. It is not to overturn decisions which are 
within the discretion and delegated power of the board to make. 
The first post-depression case was Stromberg v. French. JB The school 
board passed a rule which said, " ••• after September 291 19301 any boy 
wearing heel plates on his shoes w.ill be refused admittance to classes and 
will be suspended or expelled until the heel plates are removed. .. 39 Murray 
Stromberg complied with the rule after he and several other boys were asked 
to do so. Later, when his mther noticed that he bad removed the heel 
plates, she questioned him and had him replace them. 
1'.'hen Murray wore the shoes with the heel plates to school, the school 
authorities sent him home. He was told he could return when he had removed 
the heel plates. His father, Mr. Stromberg, was informed of the action by' 
the school board and met 111 th them. Mr. Stromberg insisted that he had 
the right to determine his son's dress at school. The school board disagreed • 
.3860 N. D. 7501 2.36 N. Vi. 477 (1931). 
39rd. at 478. 
-
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As a result, Mr. Stromberg sought to enjoin the school board from en-
forcing the rule which he considered arbitrary and unreasonable. The lower 
trial court upheld the rule as a reasonable one and also upheld the school 
board's right to enforce it. The decision was appealed by lfr. Stromberg. 
The North Dakota Supreme Court was asked to decide several issues. To 
review the rule, they applied the three part validity test. The higher 
court found that the school board was granted its authority by the legisla-
ture and also indirectly from the state and federal constitutions. Next, 
the court noted that the proper procedure was foll01'8d by the school board 
:fn its enactment and enforcement of the rule. In the court's opinion, the 
rule was reasonable because it was aimed at the conservation of school pro-
perty and the maintenance of good school order and discipline. 
The higher court •s also asked to determine if the right of the parents 
to educate, discipline, and direct their children. was paramount to the public 
interest. The North Dakota court agreed with the trial court that the rule 
did not cause a hardship or indignity to the Stranberg family, and that the 
public interest in education ..as paramount to the parent's rights. 
The plaintiff in his issues also asked if the school board would be 
able to absolutely prescribe apparel. The court replied that the safeguard 
of reasonableness in the three part validity test would prevent this from 
occurring. 
Finally, the plaintiff claimed that Murray should not be expelled for 
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insubordination because there was no malice nor a willful disregard of rules 
on Murray's part. He was an obedient son following his parents' direction. 
The North Dakota Supreme Court .found J.hrray to be insubordinate. To explain 
its reasoning the court said, "No rule or regulation could be enforced, 
provided the parent directed the pupil not to observe it." 40 
Relief was denied Mr. Stromberg and judgment of the lower court was 
af'.f'irmed • 
. The case of AntelJ. v, stokes primarily' dealt with secret organizations~ 
The school committee passed a rule prohibiting secret organizations, One 
part of the rule mentioned dress. It stated, "The wearing of jerseys, 
sweaters, caps, or other conspicuous evidence or membership in an unapproved 
secret organization is hereby .forbidden on the school premiaes."la 
Mr. Antell asked for a writ of mandamus. He •nted the court to deter-
mine if the school committee had the authority to regulate secret student 
organizations, Musacho.setts' statutory law gave the school committee the 
right to supervise and control all athletic and other organisations when 
they are connected with the school. The court interpreted this right to 
mean, "Rules adopted by the constituted authorities for the goverance of 
40rd, at 480 
~87 Mass. 362, 191 N. E. 407 (1934). 
42Id, at 4o8 
-
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public schools must be presumed to be based upon mature deliberation and 
.for the welfare of the co:rmnunity."43 The court dismissed the petition. 
Although no comment was made about student dress by neither the court nor 
Mr. Antell, this case was included in this study' to accuratel.7 trace the 
chronological development of student dress cases. 
In Matheson v. Brady, a petition :f'or a writ of mandamus was sought to 
compel the defendant to permit Mr. Jlatheson•s daughter to attend classes in 
alacks. 44 In their briefs, neither party used the proper procedure in stat-
ing that the Forest Park High School was part of the state school system. 
The Georgia Superior Court aaid1 
There is no allegation that it is a part of the State School System., 
either as a count.1-wide school system or an independent school syatemJ 
and in the absence of such allegation, there is no official duf;J' 
alleged •••• There is nothing in the petition that designates the 
Forest Park High School as being a part of the State School s,atem, 
any more than as a private school. Even though, in fact, it be a 
part of the State School System, this court, oould not take judicial 
cognizance thereof under the Code, I 38-112.Lc:> 
This section of the Georgia code limtted the court's cognizance or previous 
court records on the same case which would have given the necessary infor-
ma tion. As a result, since it 198.s not stated as part of the Georgia school 
system and the code prevented the court from referring to the records, the 
petition was dismissed. 
43~. at 407. 
44202 Ga. 5001 43 S. E. 2d 703 (1947). 
16Id. at 704. 
-
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The case of Mitchell v, McCall was unique. 46 Eulene Mitchell was sus-
pended from a public school in Alabama for refusing to (a) wear the prescribed 
gym costume, (b} perform certain physical exercises, and (c} attend the 
physical education course because her attendance would require her to be 
present when the other girls wore the prescribed costumes and performed the 
exercises she considered innodest and sinful. The school board and the 
Mitchell family reached a compromise on the costume and the exercises, The 
Alabama Supreme Court •s only oonoemed with Eulene 's physic.al a ttend.ance. 
Mr. Mitchell claimed Eulene's attendance would be a violation of her religious 
rights secured by the state and federal constitutions. 
The court pointed out that Alabama was under no constitutional obliga-
tion to provide public schools and school attendance was not required. Bo.t 
a statute did require a physical education course to be e&?Tied out in the 
public, private, and parochial schools of the state. 
The court reasoned that Eulene did have the right to make use of state 
:facilities, and that n, •• the State of Alabama can place reasonable, non-
discrim.1.nating conditions on the privilege of attending public schools since 
47 
such attendance is voluntary," It was also noted that the school did make 
certain concessions because of Eulene's religious beliefs. 
The court then stated: 
4~73 Ala, 6o41 143 So, 2d 6291 632 (1962}. 
47Id. 
-
31 
All citizens in so far as they hold views different from the majority 
of their fellows are subject to such inconveniences. • • .It is pre-
cisely every citizens right to be a "speckled bird" that our consti-
tutions, state and federal, seek to insure. And solace for the em-
barrassment that is attendant upon holding such beliefs must be found 
by the individual citizen in his,_JJOral courage and strength of convic-
tion, and not in a court of law.t16 
If Eulene did not agree with the court decision, she did not have to go to 
school. For these reasons, the court decided that her constitutional rights 
were not violated. 
There is no indication that the case of Mitchell. v. McCall was appealed 
to the Supreme Court of the United States. 49 It is probable that the United 
States Supreme Court wruld have overruled the Alabama Supreme Court decision 
because 'Rulene•s religious beliefs were limited by the Alabama court. Thia 
is an infringement of her constitutional rights guaranteed in the First Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution. 
One of the leading cases involving rules about the length and style of a 
student's hair was Leonard v. School Committee of Attleboro.so After attend-
:lng classes at his high school for two da)rs, George Leonard, a senior, waa 
told to get a haircut and ns not permitted to return to his classes until he 
had so done. George •s a professional :maicia.n since the age of twelve. He 
had performed at the Newport Jazz Festival and the New York World's Fair. 
5~49 Mass. 704, 212 N. E. 2d 468, lh A. L. R. 3d 1192 (l96S). 
I 
32 
His professional image in part was based on his hair sty-le and a change in 
image might affect his success. 
His parents requested a hearing to discuss and explain the situation. 
However, no settlement was reached betwen the board and the Leonarda. As a 
result, George's parents, in his behalf sought injunctive relief to compel 
the school to readmit him. They also questioned the rule as being unreason-
able and arbitrary since they" believed hair styles had no connection with 
the successful operation of the school. Instead, they felt this to be an 
invasion of family privacy. 
The Massacmsetts court's reasoning was based on 'two parts of the three 
part validity teat. The court noted that the proper procedure bad been 
followed by the school board and its represE!ltatives thus fulfilling one 
part of the validity teat. The court did not cite evidence nor committee 
reports to indicate that George•• hair had interfered with discipline. 
Instead, the court theorized that the rule •a reasonable b,y sayings 
We are of opinion that the unusual hair style of the plaintiff could 
disrupt and impede the maintenance of a proper classroom atzoosphere 
or decorum. Thia is an aspect of personal appearance and hence akin 
to matters of dress. Thus, as with any unusual, immodest or exag-
gerated mde of dress, conspicuous departures f'rom accepted customs 
in the ti.litter of haircuts could result in the distraction of other 
pupUe.!>J. 
The reasonable part of the valldi ty test was fulfilled. 
S1:rd. at h72. 
-
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The court connnented on the Leonard's claim of an invasion of family 
privacy. It felt that the rights of the students, teachers, and others ?.ere 
paramount in maintaining an efficient school system. 
The last state level student appearance case was Akin v. Board of 
Education of Riverside Unified School Distriot.52 In this case the court bad 
to decide if a school regulation that prohibited students .from wearing beards 
was an infringement of federal and state constitutionally guaranteed .freedoms. 
In September, 19651 Kevin Akin after grOl'ling a beard enrolled at Polytechnic 
High School in Riverside. The school board also in September, 1965 adopted 
a good grooming policy which prohibited students from waring beards. Since 
he violated the school policy., Kevin was suspended. For the rest of the 
196S-l966 school year ~ .q:'::.ten<led a private school where he •s permitted 
to wear hie beard. In the .fall of 19661 Kevin tried to enroll at Polyteclmio 
High School, rut he was denied admission because of his beard. 
On September 161 1966 Kevin •s pa.rents acting on bis behalf' filed a 
petition tor a writ of man.dams in the Superior Court. The writ was denied. 
The Akins appealed to the Califomia state Court of Appeals. They claimed 
that the school board had violated Kevin's constitutional right of .freedom 
of speech as expressed in the First Amendment and his constitutional right 
of liberty founded in the Fourteenth Amendment. 
5268 ea1. Rptr. S57 (1968). 
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The Akins asked two witnesses to testi.fY. One witness was a teacher 
trom the private school that Kevin attended. He said that Kevin was a good 
student and that there was no discipline problem resulting from Kevin's beard. 
The Akins second witness was a bearded student who testified that he had 
attended summer school at North High School in Riverside. He testified that 
neither the principal nor teachers directed him to remove the beard and that 
there was no incident because of his beard. 
The Akins then noted that Kevin •s father 10re a beard and that Kevin 
was imitating him. They concluded. by saying that they were no longer 
financ~ able to afford private schooling :fbr Kevin. 
The state Court of Appeals reasoned that the school bad ab.om the reg-
ulation to be a reasonable one by citing two examples of difficulties w.i. th 
beards. One example was a foreign student wb:> had a moustache. The boy was 
ridiculed. The other example dealt with a basketball player who also had a 
moustache. Disruption reau1ted when other boys wanted one. Since an aca-
demic system ia beat served when there i8 no disru.ption1 the regu.lation 
prohibiting beards and moustaches was reasonable. 
The court also noted that when the benefit gained by the public out-
weighed the individual's right1 the public benefit was more important. F\J.r-
thermore the court pointed out that no other alter.native which was less 
subversive of the student's constitutional rights was available. Lastly, the 
court reasoned, citing Leonard v. School Committee of Attleboro as precedent, 
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that family privacy must give way to school discipline because community 
rights are paramount.53 For these reasons, the lo•r court verdict was up. 
held. 
In summary, the school board as an administrative agency is to manage 
the schools so that the process or education may success:f\lll.y continue. The 
individual has recourse to judicial review by' a court if be believes that 
the administrative action only when the proper procedure is followed. 
To review rule mak1.ng1 the court usually uses the three part validity 
test. To review the areas of enforcement and adjudication, the court uses 
the substantial.evidence rule. However, the primary purpose of the court is 
to be certain that there is no abuse of authority by the school board and 
its representatives. 
Between 1931 and 1968, six cases pretained to student dress and appear-
ance. In five of these instances, the three part validity test was applied. 
In 19311 in the case of Stromberg v. French, Mr. Stromberg thought that a 
school regulation prohibiting heel plates on shoes was unreasonable.54 The 
North Dakota court after reviewing the school board's source of authority, 
the procedure used, and the regulation as described in the validity test, 
'\ 
ft>und that the school board had fulfilled the requirements when making and 
enforcing the regulation prohibiting heel pl.ates on shoes. 
5)349 Mass. 7041 212 N. E. 2d 468, 14 A. L. R. 3 d 1192 (1965). 
5~ N. D. '/SO, 236 N. ~~ 477 (1931). 
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In 19341 the case of Antell v. Stokes dealt with a question of the 
school committee's authority to regulate organizations.SS The Massachusett•a 
court found that statutory law gave the school committee the right to super-
vise and control all athletic and other organizations connected 1d th the 
school. Thirty-one years later in Leonard v. School Committee of Attleboro, 
the reasonableness of the school regulation determining the length and style 
of a student's hair was challenged.56 The Masaachusett•s court noted that 
the school has the power to make rules and that the proper procedure had 
been followed. It also noted that the hairst.,'le of a student could interfere 
with discipline. The rule was reasonable because it prevented possible dis-
ruption. The school board had tulti.lled the validity test. 
The fourth instance in llhioh the validity teat was applied ss Matheson 
. 51 
v. Brad;y. This case failed the proper procedure part of the test. Neither 
party had stated that the high school was a part of the Georgia school sys-
tem. Georgia statutes prohibit courts from refe?Ting to previous court 
records. .As a result, the petition was dismissed. 
The firth and most recent case was Akin v. Board or Education of River-
side Unified School District.58 The reasonableness part of the three part 
552a1 Mass. 362, 191 N. E. 407 (19.34). 
56 
.349 Mass. 704, 212 N. E. 2 d 468, lh A. L. R. 3 d ll9'l (1965). 
57202 oa. 5001 43 s. E. 2 d 703 (1947). 
5B68 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1968). 
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validity test •s used to determine if a school regulation prohibiting beards 
was not in violation of the student's rights. The court noted that since 
previous beard.a and moustaches caused disruptions in the school, the regu-
lation was a reasonable one. It also noted that ldlen there is a conflict 
between community rights and individual rights, community rights are para-
mount. The court ruled in favor of the school. 
The sixth case, Mitchell v. McCall, dealt with religious r1ghts.-'9 The 
Alabama court found that since there were no requirements for compulsory 
school attendance and because concessions had been made for l!Ulene Mitchell's 
religious beliefs, she would have to abide with the statute requiring that 
a peysical education course be provided for and ful.f:Uled by the students. 
This case was not appealled. If it had been brought to the United states 
Supreme Court, it 1t0uld have been interesting to note the court's decision 
regarding the constitutionality of the decision. 
One explanation for the limited number of post-depression appearance 
oases might be the precedent established by pre-depression student appearance 
oases. Individuals considering litigation could have been disheartened by 
the court 1 s rulings in the earlier oases which usually found the school 
board to be legal.17 correct. It 'W&8 easier to comply with the rule or reg-
ulation of the school board than to litigate. Another explanation mi.ght be 
S9273 Ala. 6o41 1h3 Bo. 2 d 629, 632 (1962). 
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that in man7 instances the school board settled the disputes aatistactorily 
so that litigation was not necessary. Still another explanation might be 
that the public, in general, agreed. with the school board's rules or regal.a.-
tiona. 
The :tollO'Wi.ng conclusions •7 be reached atter a.nal.1'zing the cases in 
this chapter& (1) the school board's right to regulate student dress and 
appearance was re-enforced, (2) proper procedure was to be followed 'b7 both 
the school board and the individual, (3) the three part ftliditJ' test .a 
applied by the court to determine the legalitJ" or the acbool ru.J.es, (h) 
reasonableness of the regulation was proven in Stromperc T. French, .Antell Tp 
Stokes, and Akin T. Board ot Edu.cation or Rt:veraide Unit:Led School Di.strict, 
(S) the court theorized the reasonableness of the acbool regulation in 
Leonard T. School Comittee of Attleboro, (6) COJllllllliiJ' rights are paramount 
to individual rights in .A.ld..n T• Board of F.dncation of Riverside UnUied 
School District, and (7) the court in Jfitchell T. »ocall llmited relig1.oua 
rights to support a school rule.6o 
6060 N. D. 1501 236 N. w. h77 (1931) J 287 Mass. 3621 191. L E. u07 (193h)J 68 ca1. Rptr. SS7 (1968)1 349 Kasa. 7041 212 N. E. 2 d 468, 14 
A. L. R. 3 d 1192 (196S)J 68 Cal. Rptr. SS? (l968)J 273 Ala. 6oh, 143 
So. 2 d 629, 632 (1962). 
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C HA?l'F,R IV 
STUDFtlT DRF28 RIGHTS AT THE FF.I>ERAL DISTRICT 
AND UNITED STATJ!l3 SUPRFXF COOR1' LEVELS 
The federal district courts have jurisdiction to hear oases where Con-
gresa has specitlcally given them the authority to do so. The lower federal 
courts have no inherent authority in and of themselves to hear any cases. 
Congress ha.a invested the lo'Wer federal courts with the power to hear cases 
involving civil liberties in Title 281 1343 (1964). This section statee: 
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any 
civil action authorized by law to be co•mced by &11' persont 
(1) To rt'!COver damages for injucy to his person or property 1 
or because of the deprivation or any right or priT.ilege of a oit-
isen of the United States, by any act done in furtherance of any 
conspiracy mentioned in section 198$ of Title h2J 
(2) To recover damages from any peraon who .fails to prevent or 
to aid in preventing any wrongs mentioned in section 198S ot Title 
h2 which he had lmowledge were about to occur and powr to preventJ 
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color or any State la.w1 
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any right, 
pri\'ilege or immnity secured by the Constitution ot the United 
States or by any Act ot Congress providing for equal r1ghte of 
citisens or of all persona 'Within the jurisdiction or the United 
State11 (4) To recover daages or to secure equitable or other relief 
under any Act of Congress providing '[,fr the protection of civil 
rights, including the right to TOte. 
~8 u. s. c. A.I 1343 (1964). 
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In adjudicating these cases brought before the court, the courts deter-
mine if there has been a violation of the Civil Rights Act ot 196h. It is 
only i.f the individual can show that he is mtitled to relief under this act 
that the court may grant relief. 
Although the federal courts decide questions of law that stem f'roDl 
common law, statutory interpretation, constitutional law, adndnistratift 
jurisdiction, fair administratiTe procedure, and protection against arbi-
trary or capricious action or abllse of discretion, the reader should be 
aware that the student personal appearance cases in this chapter are con-
stitutional in nature. In order to determine the constitutionalitJ' ot a 
regulation., the courts• examine the United States Constitution and the 
statutory provisions of the Civil Ri.ghts Act of 1964. The reader should 
also be cautioned that in the oases in this chapter the courts are only 
concemed with the rule making function or the school board and not the 
adjudicative function.62 The latter is probably onl1' necee8&1'7 to show 
that the rule either has or will be enforced so that the student may show 
that he may properly ask the court to intervene to protect h18 civil 
rights. 
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States differs 
from the lower federal courts. The Constitution states a 
62ror an explanation of the administrative agency functions, refer to 
chapter t"WO, pages seven and eight. 
• • .--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
ConsulsJ-to all Casas of admiralty and maritime JurisdictionJ-to 
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Part7J-to Contro-
versies between two or nx>re statesJ-between a State and Citizens of 
another StateJ-between citizens of different StatesJ-between Citizens 
of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of dif"ferent states, and 
between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citisena, 
or Subjects. 
In all Cases affecting .Ambassadors, other public M'inistera and 
Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the 1JUpreme Court 
shall have original Jurisdiction. In all other cases before mentioned, 
the 8Upreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law 
and Fact, with such ~eptions, and under such Regulations as the 
Congress shall make. 
The Supreme Court in all the peramal appeaNn.ce cases has appellate 
jurisdiction. This means that the case mat involve •tters within its 
jurisdiction and that the case must be brought on appeal to ti. Supreme 
Court of the United states. The Supreme Court reviews law and tact under 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
The first federal district court decision regarding student appearance 
•s made in Burnside v. &rara.64 In September, 1964, a group or Negro 
students wore treedom buttons (which bad the vcrds "One van One Vote• and 
"SNCC") to the Brooker T. W&sbington High School in Mississippi. The 
principal, Mr. Moore, announced that the buttons were not to be 'WOrn in 
school or in class. 
6Ju • s. Const. art. III I 2. 
64363 F. 2 d 744 (1966). 
i I! 
Mr. Moore believed that this disciplinary regulation was necessary 
because the buttons did not have any bearing on their education and would 
cause a commotion in the school. It is interesting to note that previously 
Beatle buttons and His-Her buttons were worn in school and that no discip-
Unary action was taken to prohibit their display. He a1so referred to the 
Student Handbook, 1962-1963. Paragraph G states: 
Regulations for Studt?nt Conduct: 
Discipline is looked upon by the administration as a means to accomplish 
two primary purposes: 
{a} to insure students and teachers against annoying, distracting 
or disorderly conduct which results in the loss of valuable time 
and learning opportunitiesJ 
(b) to help d~elop w.t thin each student the capacity for enlightened 
self control. 
On September 21, 1964, three or four students wore the buttons. They 
vrere given the opportunity to remove them. The three who re.fused were sent 
home. The next day all were back in school without the buttons. On Septem-
ber 24, 1961h Mr. Moore was sw:mnoned to a class where thirty c:e forty students 
were displaying the buttons. They nre given a choice of removing the buttons 
or going home. The majority went home and were suspended for a week. A 
letter concerning the suspension was sent home. 
All the parents, except for Mrs. Burnside, Mrs. English, and Mrs. Morris, 
cooperated with the school. These three ladies instituted civil rights action 
under la U. S. C. A. I 1983 {1964) for a preliminary injunction pursuant to 
65rd. at 746. 
-
28 u. s. c. A.I 1343 (1964) to prevent school officials from enforcing the 
regulation. Section 1983 atatesr 
F.very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regu-
lation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citisen or the United States or other 
person with1.n the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or imnam1t1ea secured by the Constitution and 
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an aM1on at law, suit 
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 
Thia section protects the •rights, privileges, and 1mmnitiea secured b:r 
the Court and La198" guaranteed to an individual.67 Section 13h3 establlahes 
the court's jurisdiction. 
The ladies also believed that the school regulation abridged the 
children's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and as a result it was an 
unreasonable rule. fha First Amendment guarantees freedom o.f e:xpresaion 
.from congressional abridgement. The Fourteenth .Amendment guarantees that 
"No state shall make or enforce an7 law which shall abridge the privileges 
or imlllnitiea of citizens of the United StatesJ nor shall any State depriYe 
any person or lite, liberty', or property, without due process of lawJ nor 
den)" to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the la111~P8 
6642 u. s. c. A.I 198.3 (1964). 
67Id. 
-
68u. s. Const. amend. XIV. 
The Court of Appeals' reasoning was intricate but logical. The First 
Amendment embraces the right to commnicate a matter of vital pnbllc conoem 
and to protect the right against intringement b)" state otticials. The Negro 
studEnts who attended an all Negro high school wore the .treedo.m buttons to 
encourage their comm.mity to exercise their civil rights. 
Although the Fourteenth Amendment protects the First .Amendment rights of 
citizens "against the State itself and all of its creatures-Boards ot F.duca-
tion not excepted," the First Amendment right or treedom of speech can be 
abridged by state officials to protect state interests.69 In lltmside v. 
Bxs!, the students were only mildly curious about the .freedom hlttons J 
there was no col'lDllOtion nor disruption of classroom decoru.m.70 As a result, 
no state interest had to be protected. The Court of Appeals held that the 
school regulation prohibiting students 1 from wearing freedom bll.ttona was 
arbitrary and unreasonable, that it was an infringement or constitutionally' 
protected rights, and that the lower court abused its discretion by refusing 
to grant an injunction. 
In conclusion, Circuit Judge Gew.1n designated the court's position by 
sayingt 
·we 'Wish to make it quite clear that we do not applaud any attempt to 
undermine the authority of the school. We support all efforts made 
b;y the school to fashion reasonable regulations for the conduct of 
69)63 F. 2 d 7441 748 (1966). 
70J:d. 
-
[, 
thair students and enforcement of the punishment incurred 'When such 
regulations are violated. Obedience to duly conati tuted authority 
is a valuable tool, and respect for those in authority met be in-
stilled in our young people. 
But, with all or this in mind, we must also emphasize that 
school officials cannot ignore expressions of feelings with which 
they do not wish to contend. They cannot infringe on their students' 
right to free and unrestricted expression as guaranteed to them 
under the First Amendment to the Constitution, where the exercise of 
such rights in the school buildings and schoolrooms do not materially" 
and substantially interfere with the regyirements of appropriate dis-
cipline in the operation of the school.n 
The same court on the same day reviewed Blackwell v. Iff!9Uen& Countz 
Board of Fducation. 72 On Januaey- 291 196' approximately thirty pupils at 
the all-Negro Henry Weather High School in Miasisaippi wore freedom badges. 
Some of these pupils were creating a disturbance by noisily talking in the 
hall. Three of these pupils were brought to the principal's office to be 
told no one 11>uld be permitted to cause a disturbance and that they were to 
remove the buttons. On February l, 1965, one hundred firty- pupila 110re 
freedom buttons and forcibq pinned the badges on them. The principal, 
Mr. Jordan, assembled the pupils in the cafeteria. He told them that they 
were forbidden to wear the buttons at school. Several students wre dis-
courteous and hostileJ they called Mr. Jordan an "Uncle Tom.• 
7lrd. at 749. 
-
72363 F. 2 d 749 (1966). 
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The next day two hundred pupils y;ore 1)uttons. They were assembled in 
the gym, were reminded of the rule prohibiting freedom buttons, and were told 
if they wore them in school, they would be suspended. On February 31 19651 
pupils wore the buttons. The principal suspended them. At this point, chaos 
broke loose. Some pupils entered classrooms urging others to go home. A bus 
driver entered the building and passed out buttons. Buttons 'l"ler~ thrown 
through the windows. ""ventually order was restored. Three hundred pupils 
were suspended for the remainder of the school year after they did not return 
to school in twenty days. 
Meanwhile, the parents met ~~th thP superintendent and principal, but no 
agreement was reached. On April 1, 1965, the parents sought civil rights 
action under 42 u. s. c. A. ! 1983 (1964) to enjoin pursuant to 23 u. s. c. A. 
I 1343 (1964) school officials from enforcing a regulation forbidding freedom 
badges as a denial of li'irst and Fourteenth Ammdment rights. The court denied 
relief' and the decision '~as appealed. 
There is a similarity bet'\11.roen the Burnside and Blackr1ell cases. 73 In 
both civil rights oases, the parents allegated thl!t the school rule prohibit-
ing the wearing of freedom badges vias an unreasonable and arbitrary rule that 
violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. However, there is also an im-
port.ant difference between the two cases. Student disorder and confusion 
73363 F. 2 d 744 (1966); .363 F. 2 d 749 (1966). 
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resulted in the Blackwell case when the freedom badges were worn.74 There 
was no student disorder in the Burnside case. 75 
The Court of Appeals rPAsoned that the constitutional guarantee of lib-
erty of expression does not grant an absolute right to speak, and that the 
law recognized that there can be an abuse of freedom of speech. In the 
Blackwell case because students were :forcing their views on others, they were 
abusing their constitutional guarantees. 76 The rights of an individual may 
not take precedence over the rights of the majority. 
The school regulation was also examined. A reasonable regulation is one 
which is "essential in maintaining order and discipline on school property •• 
• and • • • 'Which measurably contributes to the maintenance of order and de-
77 
corum within the educational system." The rule forbidding the wearing of 
freedom buttons was necessary to maintain discipline. 
For these reasons, relief wns denied. 
Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School District was a hair style ease.78 
74363 (i'. 2 d 749 (1966). 
?5363 F. 2 d 7L4 (1966). 
76363 F. 2 d 749 (1966). 
77& at 753. 
78261 F. Supp. 516 (1966). 
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Phillip Ferrell, Stephen Vlebb1 Paul Jarvis, their mothers, and their agent, 
Kent Alexander, on September 11 19661 reported to the principal's office 
instead of their homerooms. The purpose of their visit was to confer with 
Mr. Lanham even though they understood that admission would be dm.ied be-
cause of their hair styles. Mr. Lanham refused to admit them and advised 
them to get their hair cut or trimmed before coming back to enroll. 
The boys, members of a combo called Sounds Unlimited, insisted that they 
were under contract with lfr. Alexander to maintain a certain style of dress 
and appearance. Instead of getting a hair cut, they went to several other 
Dallas high schools seeking to transfer but were advised by Mr. Lanham that 
it 11as too late to apply tor a transfer. The boys then went to the Adminis-
tration Building of the Dallas Independent School District to sM the super-
intendent, Dr. White. On the steps of the building, Paul Jarvis met Mr. 
Allen, the assistant superintendent. Paul was told that there was no rule 
conoem.ing hair length. '1'he policy -. that each principal determined the 
building's code of discipline. Later in a phone conversation with the 
plaintiffs' attorney, Dr. White advised them he would stand behind his prin-
cipal. 
Paul Jarvis also said Mr. Lanham first told him he 1IOUl.d be admitted in 
school but would have to have his hair trimmed in a couple of days. However, 
the next day lfr. Lanham told Jarvis that the matter had been reconsidered 
and that he would not be adm:I. tted until his hair was trimmed. 
On September 81 19661 the boys tried to enroll again. lfr. Lanham refused 
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to enroll them because of their Beatle hair styles. Meanwhile, Mr. Alexander 
notified three television stations and half a dozen radio stations of the 
boys• enrollment difficulties. A..f'ter the unsuccessfUl conference with 
Mr. Lanbam1 the group ccm.dueted interviews. Their st017 •s reported on all 
the television channels complete with film and interviews. In addition, 
there was local and national newscoverage. Later on the same day, the combo 
recorded a song entitled "Keep Your Hands Off of It" 'Which •s distributed 
by Mr. Alexander to the local radio stations. 
The boys' parents instituted the court proceedings claiming that Mr. 
Lanham1s action was arbitrary, discriminating, and violated their constitu-
tional rights. The court's jurisdiction was based on section one of Amend-
ment Fourteen and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Public Law 88-3S2, Title 
42, u. s. c. A. and partioulari:cy 8 I 19811 198)1 and 2000 a (1964). 
Section 1981 statesa 
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall 
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce 
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the .full and 
equal benetit of all lawa and proceedings tor the security of per-
sons and propert7 as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be sub-
ject to like punishment, pains, penalti'~' taxes, licenses, and ai-
actions of nery kind, and to no other. 
Section 1983 protects the individual from any deprivation of "rights, 
80 privileges, or 1.mnnnitiee secured by the Constitution and laWB." 
79ia u. s. c. A. I 1981 (1964). 
Bola u. s. c. A. I 1983 (1964). 
And section 2000 a-1 statesi 
All persons shall be entitled to be free, at any establishment 
or place, from discrimination or segregation of any kind on the ground 
of race, color, religion, or national origin, it such discrimination 
or segregation is or purports to be required by any law, statute, o~ 
dinance, regulation, ruleeior order of a State or an:y agency or polit-
ical. subdivision thereof. 
The defendants claimed that there was no question involving United States 
laws nor the United states Constitution. They also claimed that the boys had 
not exhausted the administrative remedies. 
The court used the three part validity test to review this case. The 
legislature delegated the school the authority to regulate the public educa-
tional system thus establishing the school's authority. The rule was issued 
pursuant to the proper procedure. 
To demonstrate that the rule was not arbitrary nor unreasonable, the 
court referred to Leonard v. School Committee of Attleboro.82 In this case, 
the possibility of disruption was sufficient to establish that hair style 
regulations were not arbitrary nor unreasonable. 
In addition, no rights of the students were deprived because there wre 
indications from earlier school incidenta that trouble would have occurred 
had the boys wearing Beatle hair cuts been permitted to enroll in school. 
The district court indicated its position by saying: 
8l 
42 u. s. c. A. I 2000 a-l (1964). 
82349 Mass. 704, 212 N. E. 2 d 468, 14 A. L. R. 3 d 1192 (1965). 
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One of the most important aims of the school should be to educate 
the individual to live sucoesafull.1" with other pecp1e in our democracy. 
Since the school authorities, by legislative grant, control the public 
educational system, their regulations play a part in the educational 
process. This is but another way of stating that society expects 8) 
public education to concem itself w1 th building young citizens •••• 
Relief was denied. 
The court's a.na'.cysis of the situation differs remarkably from the Burn-
-
!!.2!, and Blackwell interpretations.84 In these two cases, the court required 
that actual disruption be evidenced to justi.f.'.r any restriction. In the 
Ferrell case, the court abandoned this procedure and instead held that actions 
of school officials are not limited to actual disruption. S) The possibility 
of disruption was sufficient to regulate. 
This raises a new issue. Ir the administration, faculty., and general 
public cause a disruption or suggest the possibility of a disruption, can the 
individual's constitutionally protected rights be abridged? 
This point was answered in Terminello v. City ot Chicago. 66 Terminello, 
advertised as a Catholic Priest, he later was found to be suspended by his 
Bishop, -was brought to Chicago to address a racist group called the Christian 
Veterans of America. In his address, "Christian Nationalism. or ·world Co:mmn-
83 261 F. Supp. Sl6, SS2 (1966). 
84363 F. 2 d 7hh (l966)J 363 F. 2 d 7.49 (1966). 
BS 261 F. Supp. Sl6 (1966). 
86 69 S. Ct. 8941 93 L. F.d. 1131 (1949). 
nism-mrl..ch?", he attacked the New Deal, "Queen" Eleanor, and the mob outside 
the auditorium as "sliJV scum, snakes, and bedbugs."87 &t he did !!,21 en-
courage violence on the part of his people. 
Terminello was arrested because anyone who "• •• aid ed ••• in making 
any improper noise, riot, disturbance, breach of the peaoe, or diversion 
tending to a breach of the peace, within the limits of tbe city ••• shall 
be deemed guilty of disorderzy- conduct. • • .n88 He was fined one hundred 
dollard by the Hmicipal Court of Chicago. He appealed to the Illinois 
Supreme Court, then to the Appellate Court, and .f1nally to the United States 
Supreme court. 
The United States Supreme Court noted that although speech is often pro-
vocative and challenging, Termi.nello did not invite action from his people. 
Instead, he received a reaction from the mob outside. The court concluded 
by indicating that the court mat protect the individual from censorship or 
punishment unless a clear and present danger above public inconvenience, 
annoyance, or unrest existed. 
Davis v. Firment was a hair style case. 89 Haward Davis violated a 
school regulation prohibiting long, shaggy hair and/or sideburns. On Sep.. 
87 Id. at 89S. 
-
88Id. 
-
89 269 F. Supp. $24 (1967). 
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tember 9th and 12th, 1966 Howard was told by at least two of his teachers 
that his hair was excessively long. On September 12th and l)th1 1966, the 
principal issued bulletins with the regulation. 
Finally on September 13, 19661 Howard was suspended for three days 
because he did not comply w.i th the regulation. Thereafter, be _, au.apended 
tor w:Ul.1'll.q disobeying the principal 1 s instruction. 
On September 22, 1966,. Mr. Davia unsucoeas.fully attempted to have Howard 
reinstated. Readmission was refused. Later »r. Davis, &.rd, and their 
attomey met with the superintendent, t1IO assistant superintendent., and the 
prlncipal. However 1 no settlement was reached. A petition of rniew of the 
superintendent's deciaion was presented to the board. The Orleans Parish 
School Board wnt on record with the superintendent and principal ae re.fusing 
readmtesion to Howard unless he obtained a hair out. Cb September 281 1966, 
Howard was readmitted art.er be had a hair out. 
The suit was brought under the Civil Rights Act, Title la u. s. c. A. I 
1981 (1964) and juriadiction was sought under h2 u. s. c. A. 1968 (1964) on 
the grounds that the action violated the First, Eighth, Ninth, .and FOUl"teenth 
Amendments of the United States Constitution. 
Section 1981 provides for equal rights under the law. Section 1988 out-
lines the proceedings in vindication of civil righta. It states• 
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the 
district courts ••• tor the protection of all persons in the United 
States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be 
exercised and enforced in con.formi ty 1i. th the la1f8 of the United 
States, so .tar as such la118 are suitable to carry the same into 
ef'fectJ but in all cases 'Where they are not adapted to the object, 
or are deficient in the provisions necessary to to.mish suitable 
remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as mod-
ified. and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State 
wherein the court having jurisdiction of such oi'Vil or criminal 
cause is held, so .tar as the same is not inconsistent with the 
Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to 
and goyern the said courts in the trial and disposition ot the 
ca.use, and, if' it is or a criminal nature, in the 1nf'l.1ct:ton of 
punishment on the party fOund guilty.90 
The court applied the three part validity test. Since the state lad 
granted the school board and ita representatives the authority" to make regu-
lations, there was no abu.se of power. Louisiana law also gives the school 
principal the right to suspend any pupil guilty of deliberate disobedience. 
Howard Davis was suspended because he dellberate:cy- diaobe;red the principal. 
The proper procedure was followed. llr. Davis, Howard, and their attor-
ney bad the opportunity to meet with the administration and with the school 
board. The regulation was considered reasonable because previou~ studaita 
had fought about hair styles. The three part valldit;y test was f'1l:filled. 
The court reasoned that since hair is not symbolic of anything1 1 t is 
not an expression guanmteed by the First Amendment tho.a answering one alle-
gation. 
The plaintiffs next claimed that a right to privacy was established in 
9042 u. s. c. A. I 1988 (1964). 
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Griswold v. Connecticut. 91 The court agreed that this case did establish 
marital privacy as a sacred and fundamental right even though marital priva.ey 
is not specified in the Constitution. &it it noted that a hair style could 
not be equated with marital privacy as a fundamental and sacred right pro-
tected by the Ninth Amendment which reads, "The enumeration in the Constitu-
tion of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others 
retained by the people."92 
The court further noted that the Eighth Amendment was not violated be-
cause no cruel and unu8ll41 punishment was administered. Finally, the court 
observed that the Fourteenth Amendment right of due proeeas of law •a not 
violated. Therefore, because no constitutional right buttressed by the 
Civil Rights Act •s at issue, relief was denied. 
Tinker v. DesMoines Independent Co!llmlnity School District is the la.st 
student appearance case to be reviewed in the chapter. 93 'l'his case is not 
in chronological order since in 1968 it was appealed to the United States 
Supreme Court. 
In December, 1965, school of.ficials llere told that several students wre 
planning to wear black a.rm bands to school to express their belie.ta relating 
91381 u. s. 479 (1965). 
92u. s. Const. amend. IX 
93258 F. Supp. 971 (1966) 1 aff'd., 393 u. s. $03 (1969). 
\ 
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to the war in Viet Nam. A regulation prohibiting arm bands on school property 
was promulgated by achool officials and supported by the board of education. 
Arter the regulation •s passed, John F. Tinker, Mary Beth Tinker, Paul 
Tinker, Hope Tinker, and Christopher Eckhardt wore the arm bands to school 
"to moum those who had died in the Viet Nam war and to support Senator Robert 
F. Kennedy's proposal that the truce pi-oposed for Christmas Day, 1965, be 
extended indefinitely."94 All of the children. lmew of the school regulation. 
They' all were BUspended and each returned to school after the Christmas holi-
day vacation without the arm bands. 
Mr. and Mrs. Tinker acting in behalf of their children took action against 
the school district, its board of directors, and certain administrative offi-
cials and teachers to recover nominal damages and obtain an injunction against 
enforcement of a regulation prohibiting the wearing of black arm bands on 
school :taeili ties pursuant to provisions of L2 u. s. c. A. I 1983 (1964). 
Jurisdiction •s sought under 28 u. s. C .. A. I 1.343 (1964) on the grounds that 
their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. 
The federal district court in their reply began with the assumption that 
freedom of speech is not absolute.. It said,, "The abridgement of speech by a 
state regulation mst al•YB be considered in terms or the object the regula-
tion is attempting to accomplish and the abridgement of speech that actually 
94rd. at 972. 
-
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ocoure."9S The court further aaidl 
A subject should never be excluded from the classroom merely 
because it ia controversial. It ia not unreasonable, however, to 
regulate the introduction and discussion of such subjects in the 
classroom. •• While the arm bands themselves may not be disruptive, 
the reactions and comments t.rom other students as a result or the 
arm bands would be likely to disturb the disciplined atmosphere 
required for any classroom. It was not unreasonable in this in-
stance for school officials to anticipate tha~ the wearing of arm 
bands would create some type of classroom disturbance. The school 
officials involved had a reasonable basis for adopting the arm band 
regulation. • • .On the other hand, the plaintiff's freedom of speech 
is infringed upon only to a limited extent. They are still free to 
wear arm bands oft achool premises. In ad.di tion, the plaintiffs are 
tree to express their views on the Viet Nam sr during any orderly 
discussion ot that subject. It is vitally important that the in-
terest of students such as the plaintiffs in current affairs be en-
couraged whenever possible. In this instance, however, it is the 
disciplined atmosphere of the classroom, not the plaintiffs' right 
to wear arm bands on school premises, which ia entitled to the pro-
tection of the law.96 
Although the plaintiffs cited Burnside v. B.yars and Blackwell v. Issa-
~ena County Board of Education, the court did not teel these decisions wre 
binding. 91 However, these decisions were to be treated 'With respect. The 
court concluded by sayinga 
• $ .it is the view of the Court that actions of school officials in 
this realm should not be limited to those instances whe;re there is a 
9Srd. 
-
96rd. at 973. 
-
97363 F. 2 d 7h4 (1966)J .363 F. 2 d 749 (1966). 
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material or substantial interference with school discipline. School 
officials met be given a wide discretion and if 1 under the circum-
stances, a disturbance in school discipline is reasonably calQUlated 
to prevent such a disruption, it must be upheld by the Court. 96 
The court found that the regulation was reasonable and did not deprive the 
plaintiffs of their constitutional rights of freedom of speech and due process 
of law. 
The Tinkers appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of the United 
States. The court accepted the decision .fbr review. Justice Fortas in 
delivering the court's opinion stated the conflict that had to be settled 
when he said, "Our problem lies in the area where students in the exercise 
of F1rst Amendment rlghts collide with the rules of the school authorities.n99 
The major:i ty recognized that the court in previous cases had emphasized 
the need for school authorities to prescribe and control conduct in the school 
and that the district court feared turmoil because United States involvement 
in Viet Nam was a controversial topic." But our Constitution says we must 
take this risk ••• and our history says that it is this sort of hazardous 
f'reedom-this kind of openness-that is the basis of our national strength 
a.nd of the independence and vigor or Americans who grow up and live in this 
relatively permissive, orten disputatious society.nlOO 
982S8 F. Supp. 971, 973 (1966) 1 aff1d, 393 U. S. 503 (1969). 
99~. 
l~. at 507. 
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To justify the prohibition or a constitutional right the state must 
-
show that there is mre than a desire to avoid the unpleasantne• accompanying 
-
an unpopular viewpoint. There •s no such finding in this case. Not all 
political symbols nor controversial symbols such as the Naai cross were pro-
hi bi ted. More importantly, there •e no disturbance. !nstead1 1 t appeared 
that the authorities w18hed to avoid present day controversial attars. For 
example, earlier an article about Viet Nam was banned from the school paper. 
Justice Fortaa stated the majority opinion. He said, •In our system, state-
operated schools may not be enclaves of totall tarianism. School off'icials 
do not possess absolute authority over their students. Students in school 
as well as out of achool are •persona' under our Constitution. ,.lOl 
The majorl ty agreed that ideas may be expressed if' done without inter-
fering with the appropriate discipline in operation of the school. In Tinker 
v. DeaKoines Independent Commnnitr School District, the wearing of black arm 
bands was a symbolic act within the tree speech clause of the First .Amendment 
and the arm bands were divorced from actual or potential dismptive bebavi~~ 
Concurring opinions were 1lr1 tten by Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice 
l1Jhi te. Justice Stewart was in agreement with the ajori ty except tor the 
"Court's uncritical assumption that, school discipline aside, the First Amend-
lOl.Id. 
-
102258 F. Bupp. 971, 973 (1966) 1 aff1d, 393 U. S. $03 (1969). 
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mmt rights of children are co-extenaive with those of adults."l03 
Justice White -. in basic agreement w1 th the majoritJ' except tor theee 
two points. He noted that all acts impinge on some valid state interest, but 
that the state baa no right to take away .freedom ot speeoh because they have 
a dnty to educate. Justice White also did not agree wlth tha Bum!ide v. 
BYar§ decieion which was cited by" the •joriv to reach their decision.lOh 
It appeara that Justice White thought the majority lacked sutticient force-
f\tlneas in their poaition. 
lfr. Justice Black and ».r. Justice Harlan each wrote a diasenting opinion. 
Justice Black began by" stating that .freedom of speech 18 llmited by" the public 
good. He further noted that there was some disruption 1n classroom routine 
becauae ot the arm bands. Justice Black then concluded that unless the court 
retumed to the reasonableness test as used by" the state courts, a new era 
ot permiHiveness 1n which the schools will be told by the students what to 
teach would begin. 
Justice Harlan wrote 1n his dissenting opinion that he did not feel the 
regulation was :motivated other than by legitimate school concerns. However, 
he did not define the 11mita ot 'What school eoncems are in restricting per-
lOJid. at SU. 
-
l0h363 F. 2 d 7b4 (1966). 
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sonal rights and liberties. 
In sunary, the federal district courts have jurisdiction to hear cases 
where Congress has spee1.f'lcal.ly given them the authority to do so. TJ.Ue 28 
I 1.34.3 grants the court jurisdiction. The individual is granted relief if 
he can show he is entitled to relief because the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
was violated and if the regulation tails the three part validity test. 
The reader should be cautioned that in the cases 1n this chapter, the 
courts are only concerned with the rul.e-aldng function or the school board 
and not the adjudicative function. 
Althollgh the Supreme Court bas original. jurisdiction in special areas, 
1n all personal appearance cases, it baa appellate juried1ction. The case 
mat involve attera within its jurisdiction and the case mat be brought on 
appeal. The Supreme Court review law and tact which have been decided in 
the lower court under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
All litigation oonceming student dress and appearance rights at the 
federal court level has occurred since Congress passed the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964. There were two instances of parents on behalf of their children 
attempting to enjoin school boards .t'rom making rules which prohibited the 
wearing of freedom badges in school. Both of these cases wre civil rights 
action brought under 42 u. s. c. A. I 1983 (1964) and 28 u. s. c. A. I 134.3 
(1964). Both also claimed that the regulation denied them their First and 
Fourteenth .Amendment rights. 
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In 1966, in the case of Ihmside v. Byars, the Court of Appeals in 
reversing the lower court held that the school regulation was arbitrary and 
unreasonable.105' F\J.rthermore1 it was an infringement of constitutionally 
protected rights. On the same day, the same Court of Appeals revie'Wed 
Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of Fdueation.1o6 In this case, the 
court reasoned that t.reedom o:f' expression is not absolute because the stu-
dents were abusing their constitutional guarantees by forcing their views 
on others. And that the rights of an individual may not taka precedence 
over the rights of the majority. The court noted that because the school 
regulation was necessary to maintaining discipline, it was a reasonable one. 
For these reasons, relief was denied. 
The two hair style cases were brought under different section of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Ferrell v. Dallas Ind!JPendent School District was 
based on Title 42 I I 1981, 1983• and 2000 a of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.107 The court applied the three part validity test and found that the 
school board had the authority to regulate, that the proper procedure was 
followed., and that the regulation was reasonable. No student rights ivere 
deprived because there were indications that if the boys had been permitted 
lOSrd. 
-
lo6363 F. 2 d 749 (1966). 
107261 F. Supp. 516 (1966). 
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to enroll, trouble would have occurred. 
The court •s analysis of the Ferrell case differs .t'rom the &rnside and 
Blackwell interpretations.108 In &.rnside and Blackwll, actual disruption 
had to be evidenced to justi:t'Y any restriction.109 In Ferrell, the possibil-
ity ot disrnption was suf'.f'icient to regul.ate.110 This raises a new issue. 
Can an individual's rights be abridged if the public's reaction to him is 
disrupti'Ve? According to Term:l.nello v. City of Chica19. the court concluded 
that the individual's rights mst be protected tram censorship or punishment 
unless there was a clear and present danger other than public inconvenience, 
annoyance or unrest. ll1 
DavU v. Firgmt was the other hair style case.ll2 Suit •s brought 
under the Civil Rights Act o:t 1964 under Title b2 I I 1981 and 1988 an the 
grounds that the action violated the First, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the United States Constitution. The court reasoned that since 
hair is not symbolic of anything, it is not an expression guaranteed by the 
First Amendment. It also noted that although the Ninth Amendment protects 
lo826l F. Supp. 5L5 (1966)J 363 F. 2 d 744 (1966)J 36.3 F. 2 d 749 (1966). 
l09363 F. 2 d 744 (1966)J 363 F. 2 d 749 (1966). 
ll0261 F. SUpp. 5L5 (1966). 
lJ.169 S. Ct. 8941 93 L. FA.. ll31 (1949). 
112269 F. Supp. 524 (1967). 
such sacred and fundamental rights as marital privacy, hair style cannot be 
equated to arital privacy. The court further noted that the Eighth Amend-
ment •a not violated because no cruel and unusual punishment •a enforced. 
And last:cy-1 the Fourt.eenth Amendment waa not 'Violated because no constitu-
tional right 111.s violated. Relief •s denied. 
The Tinker v. Dedoines l'nde,f!!!dent Communitl School Diatrlct case •s 
reviewed at the federal district level and by the United States supreme 
court.113 Suit 111.a brought tor nominal damages and to obtain injunctive 
relief pursuant to Title 42 I 1983 and Title 28 I l3la3 en the grounda that 
the First and Fourteenth Analdment rights wre violated. 
The lower court found that it there is a possibility of disruption in 
the school, school o.ttioial.e 1111St be given a wide discretion in •king pre-
ventive regulations. It al.eo stated that the disciplined ataoaphere of a 
classroom, not the individual's rights, had precedent and protection of the 
law. 
The Suprene Court re'ri.ned the case on appeal. The majority opinion, 
written by Justice Fortaa, reasoned that to justify the prohibition ot a con-
stitutional right, the state mat show that there 1a more than a desire to 
avoid the unpleaaantneas acoompan'1rtg an unpopular viewpoint. There was none 
shown in this case. Furthermore, ideas may be expressed if they cause no 
ll32$8 F. Supp. 971 (1966)1 a.t'f1d1 393 U. S. 503 (1969). 
disruption of discipline. Black arm bands are symbolic acts protected by 
the First Amendment. For these reasons, the court found for the plaintiffs. 
Concurring opinions were written by Mr. Justice Stewart and lfr. Justice 
White. Mr. Justice Stewart was in agreement with the majority except for the 
court's assumption that children's rights are co-extensive w.lth adult rights. 
It appears that Justice White thought the majority lacked su:f.f'icient force-
fulness in their position. 
Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Harlan each 'W?'Ote a dissenting opinion. 
Justice Black felt that treedom of speech can be lim1 ted by the public good. 
He also noted that unless the court returned to the reasonableness test as 
used by the state court, a new era of permissiveness would begin. Justice 
Harlan 'W?'Ote that he felt the regulation was motivated by legitimate school 
ooncems. 
The limited number or student appearance litigation at the .federal court 
level can be attributed to the complexity o.f constitutional issues. For ex-
ample, the First Amendment's protection of freedom of speech is difficult to 
de.fine. In United States v. O'Brien, O'Brien burned his selective service 
card to express his anti-war views.114 O'Brien claimed that his constitution-
al guarantee of symbolic speech was violated because he was arrested for 
knowingly destroying or mutilating a selective service certificate. Chief 
114aa s. Ct. 1673, 20 L. F.,d. 2 d 672 (1968). 
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Justice 1''arren, representing the majority of eight justices, pointed out that 
the government had a substantial interest; and that burning the selective 
service ca.rd was sufficiently frustrating to the government's interest to 
uphold the conviction. As a result, the court dismissed the idea that all 
types of symbolic conduct are protected under the First Amendment. 
In the Burnside and Blackwell cases, freedom badges were recognized as 
symbolic speech.ll5 And in the Tinker case, black arm bands were recognized 
as Sj1lllbolic speeeh.116 Both the freedom badges and the black arm bands rei>-
resented an ideal. However, in the Fe?Tell and Davis eases, hair was not 
recognized as symbolic speech because it did not stand for anything.117 
The Ninth Amendment sa7s,, "The enumeration in the Constitution, of cer-
tain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by 
the people."118 Doee this Amendment protect the right to determine your per-
sonal appearance as a .fundamental and sacred right? According to the court 
in Davis v. Firment, the right to determine hair styles is not sacred nor 
.fundamental.119 
l.J5363 F. 2 d 744 (1966)J 363 F. 2 d 749 (1966). 
ll6258 F. Supp. 971 (1966) 1 aff1d, 393 U. S. 503 (1969). 
ll7261 F. Supp. 545 (1966}J 269 F. Supp. 524 (1967). 
118 u. s. Const. amend. II 
ll9269 F. Supp. 524 (1967). 
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The nebulousness of the Fourteenth Amendma'lt presents more difficulties. 
Some people interpret the Fourteenth Amendment as protecting the First Ansnd-
ment right of freedom of speech because of the words " ••• nor sha.U any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law. • • • ttl20 The word liberty may connote f'reedom of speech,, but it 
also may connote other .freedoms, 
Another explanation for limited cases a.t the federal level may be the 
Civil Rights Act. Since its enactment in 1964, the courts have reviewed six 
appeals. This vrould indicate that more litigation will be brought to the 
federal level. Then again, until the Supreme Court resolved the con.flict 
between actual disruption versus potential disruption, JDEIJ'lY people did not 
bring litigation. 
Still another reason .f'or limited litigation might be public agreement 
with the school rules and regulations. Perhaps, the administrative agency 
or lower courts successfully resolved the issues. Or an alternative might 
be that it was easier to comply with the rule or regulation than to litigate. 
The following conclusions may be reached after analyzing the cases 1n 
this chapter: (1) the school board's right to make rules that regulate etu- 11!! 1 
I 
dent dress and appearance was established, (2) the court used tre United 
States Constitution and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to determine the con-
stitutionality of an issue, (3) the court also applied the three part valid.it 
12n.. 
-u. s. Const. amend. XIV 
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test to determine the legality of a school regulation or rule, (4) in ~­
side v. 'Byars and in Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of Fducation, free-
dom badges were recognized as symbolic speech, (5) in the Burnside and Black-
well cases, the court used actual violence as a basis for abridging symbolic 
-
freedom of speech, (6) in Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School District, 
potential disruption was recognized as sufficient cause to abridge constitu-
tionally guaranteed freedoma1 (7) in Davis v. Firment, hair was not recog-
nized as symbolic speech, (8) in Tinker v. DesMoines Independent Community 
School District,, the Supreme Court recognized black arm bands as symbolic 
speech protected by the First Amendment, and (9) in the Tinker case, the 
Supreme Court agreed that the black arm bands were divorced from potential 
and actual disruption, therefore no clear and present danger was shown as 
grounds to abridge a constitution~ protected right.121 
121363 F. 2 d 744 {1966); 363 F. 2 d 749 {1966)J ~1·J 261 F. Supp. 5L5 (1966); 269 F. Supp. 524 (1967)J 258 F. supp. 971 (196 , arr•d, 393 u. s. 
503 {1969) J .!.5!· 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this thesis is to trace the development of court 
decisions in the United States which have infiuenced and determined students• 
personal appearance rights in public high schools between 1900 and 1968. 
Be.fore summarizing the development of these decisions, it is necessary to 
review the school board's and court's roles. 
The school board is recognized as a specialized administrative agency 
capable of rule making, enforcement, and adjudication within the authority 
granted by the legislature and limited by the federal and state constitutions. 
Its purpose is to manage the schools so that the process of education ma.y 
suocessf\J.l.ly continue. 
The individual has recourse to judicial review if he believes that the 
administrative action has violated his rights. Normally, the lower court will 
only review the administrative action when the proper legal procedure is .fol-
lowed. If the administrative remedies are not adequate., the court will disre-
gard the normal legal procedure. 
To revie;v rule making, the state courts use the three part validity test 
to determine if the regulation was n • • .{a) within the granted power, (b) 
69 
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122 issued pursuant to proper procedure, and (c) reasonable." To review the 
areas of enforcement and adjudication, the court uses the substantial-evidence 
rule. !!Xtraordinary remedies are also available to enforce a right or to 
prevent a violation of the individual's rights. The court's purpose should 
be rememberedJ it is to be certain that there is no abuse of power by the 
school board and its representatives. 
The pre-depression oases discussed in chapter two established certain 
precedents. One was the school board's right to make rules that regulate 
student dress and appearance. Another precedent was that the court accepted 
the three part validity test as a standard to determine the legality of the 
school board rule. Although the use of proper procedure was stressed by the 
court, the rule's reasonableness was on~ questioned by the court majority 
in V§lentine v, Ind.ependent Schoo1 Distriot.123 
The post-depression oases analyzed in chapter three enforced the school 
board's right to regu.lateJ they also confirmed the court's use of the three 
part validity test in determining the legality of the regulation. In the 
earlier oases, the court emphasized that the administrative agency had the 
granted authority and followed the proper procedure. In the post-depression 
cases, the court's emphasis •s placed on the reasonableness of the rule. 
122Davis at 87. 
l231a7 Ia. 555. li74 N. w. 334 (19l.9)J 191 Ia. 1100, 183 N. w. 434 (1921), 
n 
And lastly, the concept that community rights were paramount to individual 
rights was introduced by the court in Akin v. Board of Education of Riverside 
Unified School District.124 
In the author's opinion, one post-depression decision, Mitchell v. Mc-
Call, was a violation of consU tuUonally protected religious rights because 
the ata te limited fulene • s religious freedom. 125 Under certain circumstances 
when the majority rights are paramount or when a clear and present danger is 
evident, it is necessary to limit the rights of an individual. But, there 
was no evidence that either situation existed in this case. If the case had 
been appealed to a federal court, it would have been interesting to note the 
federal court's decision. 
By 19681 the state court position was clearly defined. In general, the 
court felt that: 
The decision of such board, if exercised in good faith, on matters 
affecting the good order and discipline of the school is final as far 
as it relates to the rights of pupils to enjoy school privileges, and 
the courts l'fil1 not interfere with the exercise of such authority unless 
it bas been illegally or unreasonably exercised; but the courts 1'ill in-
terfere to prevent the enforcement of a rule which deprives a pupil of 
rights to which the law entitles him, or which tends to alienate the 
pupil from proper parental authority, or which manifes~ reaches be-
yond the school board's powers, or beyond its sphere of acUon, and re-
lates to subjects 1n no •Y connected with the management or successful 
operation of the school, or which is plainly calculated to subve1}2gr retard the leading object of the school legislation of the state. 
121.J6a Cal. Rptr. S57 {1968). 
125273 Al.a. 6o4, 143 so. 2 d 629, 632 {1962). 
12679 c. J. s. Schools and School Districts I 494 (19$2). 
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The personal appearance cases in chapter four are concerned with the 
rule naldng function of the school board. The federal district courts have 
jurisdiction to hear cases where Congress has specifically given them the 
authority to do so. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 grants the federal courts• 
jurisdiction. To review the regulation's legality, the court expects the 
individual to show that he is entitled to relief because the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 was violated. The court also applies the three pa.rt validity 
test to the regulation. 
Although the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in special areas, 
in all personal appearance oases, it has appellate jurisdiction. This means 
the case mst involve matters within its jurisdiction and the case :rrust be 
brought on appeal; the Supreme Court reviews law and f'act which have been 
decided in the lower court. 
The federal court cases established a criteria for abridging an indi-
vidnal1s constitutional rights. The court recognized that when there is a 
conflict bet"Ween the rights of many and the rights or an individual, the 
individual's rights mst be abridged. In hair style cases, the lower fed-
eral courts have found that the threat of potential disruption to be enough 
cause to reasonably abridge the individual's rights. However, the Supreme 
Court in Tinker v. DesMoines Independent Community Soh$lol District indicated 
that before freedom of symbolic speech be ourtaileC.1 there must be an actual 
disruption.127 Badges and arm bands were accepted as symbolic speech, but 
127258 F. Supp. 971 (1966), afftd, 393 U. S. 503 (1969). 
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hair styles were rejected by the lower courts because they did not, in the 
courts• opinions, symbolize anything. 
The courts developed w1 th time a gradual and more liberal attitude. 
First, it was necessary to establish the rights of the school board; next, 
the proper procedure had to be followed; and thEl'l1 the reasonableness of the 
rule was questioned. At present, the individual's constitutional right to 
freedom of speech is deemed more vital than the potential disruption, it may 
incite. In the future, it is probable that the court will hold similar views 
about freedom of dress. 
FJVen though the court's position has changed and progressoo w.:!. th the 
times, it is still criticized in some quarters for not doing enough or doing 
too mch. The ll?"iter has "traced the development of court. decisions in the 
I 
United States which have influenced and determined students• personal appear-
ance rights in public high schools between 1900 and 1968 so that educators, 
students, and the general public be aware of the court's reasoning. This 
synopsis should be helpful not only to the student so that he may determine 
his rights, but also to the educator who mst make and enforce school regula-
tions. 
Because the Supreme Court decision in Tinker v. Des:Moinea Independent 
Communixz School District resolved a difference in legal interpretation at 
the federal court level, there should be an influx of personal appearance 
128 
cases. F.ach of these can and may modi:fY the position of the court. The 
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writer recommends that further research be conducted to account for and 
analyze recent decisions. 
future cases "Will primarily involve complex constitutional matters. 
Since constitutional la:w is remarkably difficult to apply, concepts seem 
to be fundamMtal and remarkably clear until they are applied to a real 
life situation. For these reasons, the writer recommends that only the 
necessary legal background and interpretation be provided. for the reader. 
In addition, the writer also recommends that future researchers be thor-
oughly familiar with legal research methods. 
Finally, the writer recommends tha. t the findings of any future research 
be ma.de available to educators, students, and the general public. Many 
misconceptions could be distilled if research results were readily accessible. 
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